February 13, 2003

A 'Road Map' for Israeli-Palestinian Amity



WASHINGTON -- In a speech last June, President Bush put forward for the
first time an American commitment to the emergence of a "viable, credible,
Palestinian state." A quartet, comprised of the U.S., the U.N., the European
Union and Russia, is now working on a road map to implement the president's
vision. Key to its success are those measures that will not only assure
Israel's security but also define the kind of state Palestinians can look

* * *

As the president declared, the Palestinian people deserve leadership and
institutions not tainted by terrorism and corruption. It is a goal the U.S.
should continue to encourage vigorously, yet without conditioning a
resumption of the peace process on the replacement of a particular
individual. To do so is to invite resistance from those in the Palestinian
population who desire change in their leadership and accountable governance,
but do not wish to be seen as doing a foreign country's bidding. It is also
unnecessary: If reforms bring about political changes, specific outcomes
(i.e., the leadership produced by the reformed system) will be of decidedly
lesser importance.

Nothing is better calculated to encourage change within Palestinian society,
and to induce Palestinians to demand an end to terror bombings and other
forms of violence, than a peace process that holds out a credible promise of
a truly viable Palestinian state.

The U.S. should take the lead in articulating that vision. Specifically, we
urge the administration to spell out that the agreement envisioned by the
U.S. should result in:

. Two independent states with boundaries approximating the pre-June 1967
borders with territorial adjustments that are the result of negotiation and
not unilateral annexation. In effect, the Palestinian "right of return" to
Israel would be exchanged for Israel's relinquishing of the settlements,
except on those territories exchanged by mutual agreement.

. Arrangements for Jerusalem that accommodate two separate sovereignties
while -- insofar as possible -- keeping the city physically undivided.

. Relief and justice for Palestinian refugees in ways that do not threaten
Israel's demographic balance (e.g., a "right of return" applied to the new
Palestinian state and generous international funding for repatriation,
resettlement and compensation.

. A protection regime for sites deemed holy by Jews, Christians and Moslems.

. Agreement on arrangements for internal and external security.

All previous efforts to end the violence and turn to a political process
have failed because each side has maintained that the first step must be
taken by the other. If the road map is not to encounter the same fate, the
U.S. and its partners must insist on a 100% Palestinian Authority effort to
end violence that is unconditional and independent of actions demanded of
Israel. They must similarly insist on an unconditional cessation of Israeli
settlement expansion (including so-called natural growth) that is
independent of actions required of Palestinians.

This parallelism is not to suggest moral equivalence. It is to recognize
that no peace talks are possible if Palestinians fail to exert 100% effort
to halt terrorism or if Israel continues to encroach on Palestinian lives
and property.

The road map should present specific standards of compliance for the
Palestinians with regard to their efforts to stop terror and for the
Israelis with respect to ending settlements. It should spell out clearly
what each side must do in order to be deemed in compliance, and there must
be an independent mechanism to monitor implementation.

There is no national security reason for the U.S. to delay such a proposal.
Indeed, there are important security reasons to spell out, without further
delay, the broad shape of the peace agreement for which the U.S. intends to
work. Arab countries and much of the Muslim world, as well as most European
countries, see a direct link between their ability to be more forthcoming in
supporting U.S. goals in Iraq and our commitment to working for a fair
settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

Phase II of the proposed road map, designed to create a Palestinian state
with "provisional borders," may well be one phase too many, for it is more
likely to prevent the parties from ever getting to Phase III, in which
permanent status issues are to be resolved. The time, energy, and political
capital spent on "provisional borders" are far better invested in
negotiations for permanent borders. The resumption of effective security
cooperation in Phase I, facilitated by internationally appointed monitors,
should enable the parties to turn directly to permanent status issues. And
the more detailed parameters of the president's two-state vision would help
give the parties a workable framework within which to come to closure.
Provisional boundaries are a dangerous distraction.

* * *

In sum, we believe that by more clearly defining the road map's destination,
the U.S. and its partners can frame eventual permanent status negotiations
in a manner that promotes a sustainable two-state outcome consistent with
both sides' interests, that associates them with the moderate majorities in
both camps, and that encourages Palestinians to undertake fundamental
changes in their institutions. It would also facilitate international
cooperation with the U.S. in its war on terrorism and in its efforts to
encourage democracy world-wide.

Mr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. Mr.
Scowcroft was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George
Bush Sr. This essay is based on recommendations that emerged from a Council
on Foreign Relations roundtable.

Updated February 13, 2003


U.S. Efforts to Build Iraq Support
Are Stymied by Global Resentment

The Washington Post

Months of painstaking efforts by U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to
win international consensus for military action against Iraq have been
complicated by a growing resentment over what many foreign diplomats regard
as the Bush administration's heavy-handed tactics over the past two years.

Those tensions boiled over at the Security Council on Friday to a degree
rarely seen in the United Nations chamber. Although Iraq's cooperation with
weapons inspectors was the official subject, U.S. behavior became an
important subtext as the audience broke U.N. rules and applauded French and
Russian demands that the rush to war be slowed.

Earlier in the week, when the U.S. tried to force action by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization to shield Turkey from an Iraqi attack, France
and Germany rebelled, leading to a standoff that some regarded as one of
NATO's gravest crises in a half-century. And although the U.S. finally
succeeded in putting the issue of North Korea's nuclear-weapons program
before the Security Council, Russia, China and South Korea made clear that
they strongly disagree with the Bush administration's refusal to meet
directly with the North Koreans.

Now, as the Bush administration readies a final push toward war -- and tries
to win diplomatic support for its policy of isolating North Korea -- the
diplomatic repercussions are affecting relations with some of the closest
U.S. allies and complicating foreign-policy goals. As U.S. officials try to
forge an agreement at the U.N. or a "coalition of the willing" to confront
Iraq, they must not only win converts to their policies, but also deftly
manage the resentments that led to the current impasse.

Experts and diplomats said international backing for a strike on Iraq
remains weak. Some smaller countries have signaled support not because they
believe in attacking Iraq, but because they want loans, business deals and a
chance to join Western institutions. Other allies are swallowing hard and
joining the campaign in part because they fear the administration is willing
to shred longstanding international institutions to topple Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the Bush administration has pursued an
especially muscular foreign policy, but foreign officials say anger at the
administration's style set in almost from the moment U.S. President Bush
took office. The administration's rejection of the Kyoto treaty to stem
global warming and Mr. Bush's abrupt dismissal of South Korea's "sunshine"
policy toward North Korea set the impression that the administration wasn't
interested in listening too closely to the concerns of its allies, diplomats
said. The administration exacerbated tensions by refusing to join the
International Criminal Court, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and announcing a doctrine of fighting preventive wars that surprised
and concerned allies.

"The administration seems to believe that if you push hard enough, everyone
will give in," said a senior European diplomat. "This hardball presentation
is part of the reason this Iraq thing has been hard to sell in a number of
European countries. Many policy makers felt their concerns weren't
adequately taken into account."

U.S. officials have dismissed such complaints, saying they regularly consult
with other nations. Officials note that Mr. Bush took the Iraq question to
the U.N. last September, and since then the administration has strived to
build support in the Security Council for aggressive inspections and
possible military force. But, they say, that doesn't mean the U.S. should
shy from a fight if it fails to achieve consensus.

"Because we are the most powerful, that places an obligation on us to listen
and to use power with care and with understanding and with restraint," Mr.
Powell said last week. "I think we are mindful of the views of others,
considerate of the views of others, but we have principles we stand on, and
we have things we believe in strongly and feel strongly about." Mr. Powell
acknowledged that the Iraq debate "has caused strains within NATO and within
the United Nations." But, he said, "whatever strains exist now, I think they
are strains that can be managed."

Boudewijn van Eenennaam, the Dutch ambassador to the U.S., said it was a
significant concession for Mr. Bush to go to the U.N. "We always said,
'Don't go it alone.' The president complied," Mr. van Eenennaam said, adding
that U.S. State Department officials with a "nasty undertone" later
contacted him to make sure the Dutch recognized Mr. Bush's gesture.

Still, Mr. van Eenennaam said, he is concerned about a "monopoly of power
without checks and balances. Self-assertiveness and an arrogance of power
[among some U.S. officials], that is a troubling thing." Foreign
officials -- and even some administration officials -- say they are
concerned that the White House and other officials have responded to the
diplomatic setbacks by putting even more pressure on U.S. allies to fall
back in line. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, contrasting the
reluctance of "Old Europe" with the instinctive pro-Americanism of "new
Europe," seemed to suggest a significant shift in U.S. orientation, away
from the traditional center of Europe and toward the nascent democracies in
the East created by the breakup of the Soviet empire.

"There are people here who are trying to destroy institutions that have
served us well since World War II -- and still have some utility -- and they
have no obvious replacement but raw American power," complained a senior
administration official.

Mr. Rumsfeld's comments drew a tart response Friday from French Foreign
Minister Dominique de Villepin at the Security Council, who remarked as he
made the case for more inspections: "This message comes to you today from an
old country, France, from a continent like mine, Europe, that has known war,
occupation, barbarity."

U.S. officials note that although France and Germany have objected to an
invasion of Iraq, 18 other countries in Europe have signed letters in
support of the U.S. position. At NATO, 16 of the 19 members backed the U.S.
request to defend Turkey. So, in the administration's view, it is France and
Germany that are isolated, not the U.S.

Mr. Powell said, "The alliance is breaking itself up because it will not
meet its responsibilities." But Zbigniew Brzezinski , national security
adviser for former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, said this attitude is
shortsighted. "A united Europe is a more serious partner for the United
States," he said. "To have a splintered Europe with by far the weakest part
of Europe on our side, is that a bargain?" Mr. Brzezinski said that even in
countries that have pledged support, "in not a single one is public opinion
in favor of a solitary war."

Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at
the American Enterprise Institute, said there is "a lot of room for
criticism on how they've [the administration] sold their case," especially
in not making enough effort to swing public opinion overseas. But she said
many analysts were misinterpreting the roots of the dispute. "All of this is
about the European Union, and it has nothing to do with the United States,"
Ms. Pletka said. "France and Germany are desperately trying to define the
EU, and the only thing they can define it as is anti-American."

Updated February 17, 2003


The Middle East's Road to Nowhere

Gleaning the optimism of Zbigniew Brzezinski's and Brent Scowcroft's "A Road
Map for Peace" (Feb. 13), one would think they are living in a pre-September
11 world. The suggested "road map" has been proven to be a dead-end.

The Palestinians were already offered everything that Messrs. Brzezinski and
Scowcroft suggest in the summer of 2000, and have responded by launching a
relentless war of terror.

Since the infamous Camp David summit, Israel has experienced a relentless
campaign of terror attacks, murdering close to 1,000 people and critically
injuring 5,000. The collapse of the peace process has revealed the mirage of

No longer can the civilized world look the other way, while the Palestinian
leadership incites mobs in Gaza to march on Tel Aviv after committing
themselves just days before in the great halls of Europe to the "peace of
the brave."

What sounds reasonable on Park Avenue, at the Council of Foreign Relations,
is contrary to the reality within a Palestinian society that gladly offers
its children as human sacrifices to achieve national aspirations. The only
hope for peace is to dismantle Arafat's infrastructure of terror; any
roadmap that fails to recognize this is misdirected.

Shalom Mitchell
Israel Info Center
New York

Updated February 18, 2003


Our Way or the Highway


"Size of protests -- it's like deciding, 'Well, I'm going to decide policy
based upon a focus group.'"

-- President Bush, when asked last week about millions of anti-war
protestors around the world.

Polls and focus groups are used by every major American politician, none
more than George W. Bush. These can be misused in two ways: to substitute
for principles and policies or to dismiss findings as inconvenient.

George W. Bush understands that domestically; virtually every pronouncement
or message is shaped by the White House's extensive public soundings. But
the administration is tone deaf when it comes to opinion elsewhere; there
seems little desire to understand, or even acknowledge, the growing negative
view of America around the world.

This is an extraordinary turn. On Sept. 11, 2001 America was hit by a
horrific terrorist attack, drawing support and empathy around the globe. We
have taken on two junior grade Hitlers, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein,
and less than a year and a half later are losing in the court of world

First this was blamed on a corrupt and backward Islamic world. True enough.
Then the villain was the always impossible French. (This isn't new; in 1965,
Charles DeGaulle declared the United States "the greatest danger in the
world today to peace.")

           NO MAS

            Does American foreign policy have a positive or negative effect
on your country?






            Source: Gallup, January 2003

But the opposition to this administration's policies and, personally, to
this president, are far more pervasive; no region and few countries are
immune. Successful national campaigns recently in Germany, South Korea and
Brazil had one common element: anti-Americanism.

Much of this is directed against war in Iraq, reflecting the
administration's failure to cogently offer what is a very compelling case
that Saddam has clearly violated the United Nations resolutions and is a
danger to the region and to the world. But the anti-American feelings are
broader; the caricature is of an out-of-control, haughty country bent on a
domineering hegemony. The Bush policies reflect more the post-World War I
Wilsonian arrogance, including the moral piety, than the inclusive
sensitivity of post-World War II's Harry Truman and George Marshall.

To be sure, as the world's only superpower, resentment is inevitable. But
the hubris the administration displays -- torching the Kyoto treaty rather
than trying to improve it, nixing the International Criminal Court embraced
by 100 other nations -- makes it considerably worse.

"It may not matter on the battlefield, but world opinion is critical to
sustaining American leadership," ventures Jimmy Carter's National Security
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. "This goes beyond the contentious French or
unreliable Germans. It's difficult to find a single country that supports
American foreign policy. That is really very serious."

The administration, or the Cheney-Rumsfeld wing, dismisses such criticism,
arguing that the old Cold War international alliances , where we had common
interests, are increasingly irrelevant. The alternative to U.S.-led and
dictated action is a dangerous passivity. On the looming war to get rid of
Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction, they say: lead and the rest will

On Iraq they are partially right. The war -- still a virtual certainty -- is
likely to be short with minimal casualties; we'll occupy Baghdad within
weeks. And don't worry about Saddam on the lam a la Osama; this guy lives in
palaces, not off the land. Then in short order it'll be clear the Iraqis
illegally possess weapons of mass destruction and the human-rights horrors
of Saddam's regime will be fully bared. War critics will be on the

But then the tough nation building starts, where we will be a target,
figuratively and literally. Unlike the Gulf War, where, conservatively, 88%
of the tab was picked up by others, much of the huge expense will come out
of American taxpayers' pockets; there will be international cooperation, but
the Bush administration has dampened enthusiasm.

There will be subsequent crises -- starting with the more perilous Korean
threat -- with an even greater need for allies. Swagger and cowboy rhetoric
complicates that task. An example: German leader Gerhard Schroeder played
the anti-Iraq war card to stay in office but, unlike the French, the Germans
have been helpful in other endeavors; No other American ally has as many
peacekeeping forces deployed in Afghanistan as Germany. Yet the verbally
reckless Donald Rumsfeld groups the Germans with the Cubans and the Libyans.

Joseph Nye, dean of the Kennedy school at Harvard, likens the
administration's behavior to a three-dimension chessboard. "The top board is
the military and we can do pretty much what we want. The middle board is
economics," Mr. Nye notes, "and is not a world America controls." The bottom
level are factors largely outside government control: terrorism, the spread
of infectious disease and weapons proliferation: "There is no America
hegemony here; we need the cooperation of others. The Cheney-Rumsfeld focus
on the top board may win in the short run, but will cause lots of problems
in the long run."

This wouldn't be easy under any circumstance; the toppling of the Berlin
Wall was a wondrous moment but ushered in a messier world. At home, the
White House appreciates that most politicians won't support them if their
constituents feel otherwise; that's one reason they do so many polls and
focus groups. They need to understand reality doesn't stop at the water's

Correction: Last week's column on judges had two errors which I would like
to blame on the inclement weather but, to paraphrase Richard Nixon, that
would be wrong. President Bush has nominated three, not one, Hispanics to
the circuit courts, having tapped two this month, and Jeffrey Sutton was
nominated for the Sixth Circuit not the Fourth.)

Updated February 27, 2003


Israeli-Palestinian Road Map to a Dead End

In response to Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft's Feb. 13
editorial-page essay "A 'Road Map' for Israeli-Palestinian Amity":

This piece, co-authored by Mr. Brzezinski , who served President Carter's
period of claiming more in the area of peace-making than was ever delivered,
follows in that tradition. There is no evidence that "nothing is better
calculated" to get someone to eschew terror than by rewarding those efforts
before terror is forsworn. More to the point, and more characteristic, is
the repeated suggestion that Israel give up something tangible in return for
something vacuous. The suggestion that the Palestinians' "right of return"
be exchanged for something tangible is disingenuous. More appropriate would
be to trade the "rights of return" of the displaced Palestinians and the
displaced Jews expelled from Arab countries.

Most noteworthy of all is the piece's continual offer of exchanging
"efforts" (mentioned three times) to stop terrorism by the Palestinians for
tangible actions by the Israelis. What good is a "100% effort" that produces
a 5% result? A trade-off of results for results would seem more appropriate.
Referring to the "moderate majorities" in both camps is clearly dissembling
in the wake of repeated surveys that show 75% of Palestinians approve of
suicide bombings and a significant majority want all of Israel removed.

Israel got very little from the Camp David accords and the Egyptians gave up
next to nothing in their peace treaty (inoperative if Israel goes to war
with another Arab country ). Anyone reasonable would be foolish to heed
these recommendations.

Stuart L. Meyer
Department of Management & Strategy
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
Evanston, Ill.

Updated February 27, 2003


Is Co-Existence Viable?

Recommendations and decisions such as Messrs. Brzezinski and Scowcroft's are
based on myths and disinformation they themselves created when they were in
power and continued and reinforced with the signing of the Oslo Accord in
1993 and beyond. Secondly, the creation of a "Palestinian State" can be
envisioned only in its proper context, i.e. as a puppet regime subject to
the other 22 Muslim dictatorships and their Islamic culture. Remember, Ehud
Barak offered 90% of the West Bank as well as East Jerusalem to the
Palestinians and it has lead to 17,000 armed attacks against Israel. Until
all Muslim countries recognize the right to Israel's existence, respect for
human rights and allow for a system of justice in their own societies,
co-existence can never be viable.

Michael Engelberg, M.D.
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Updated February 27, 2003


Bush's Plan Is Simple

Messrs. Brzezinski and Scowroft demonstrated their ability to praise the
landmark speech of President Bush and then convolute the process into the
already proven failure of the past administration. For all their concern for
the Palestinian Arab's sensibility, they have glossed over why the current
situation exists. Whenever a milestone timetable is established, terrorist
organizations ignore the requirements and simply insist that the other side
capitulate. Unfortunately those "helpful friends" who set the milestones
never seem to have the courage to halt the proceedings and boldly state that
the terrorist is at fault. President Bush, on the other hand, has held out
the possibility of real peace and sovereignty for the Palestinian Arabs.
Instead of restating a discredited plan, he identified the required actions
that can lead to future discussions and the eventual establishment of their
own country. The Palestinian Arabs must first replace their corrupt leader,
dismantle their terrorist organizations, and establish democratic rule.
Without observing these primary road marks, there can be no true peace.

President Bush's plan is simple, straightforward and verifiable. Former
advisers to the executive branch should not only praise the plan but support

Freda Goldman

Updated February 27, 2003


A Relentless War of Terror

The suggested road map is a dead-end. The Palestinians were offered
everything that Brzezinski and Scowcroft put forward in 2000 and responded
by launching a relentless war of terror.

Since the infamous Camp David summit, Israel has experienced more than
16,000 terror attacks, murdering about 1,000 people and critically injuring
5,000. The collapse of the peace process has revealed the mirage of Oslo. No
longer can the civilized world look the other way while the Palestinian
leadership incites mobs in Gaza to march on Tel Aviv after committing
themselves just days before in the great halls of Europe to the "peace of
the brave."

What sounds reasonable on Park Avenue at the Council of Foreign Relations is
contrary to the reality within a Palestinian society that gladly offers its
children as human sacrifices to achieve national aspirations. The only hope
for peace is to dismantle Arafat's infrastructure of terror; any road map
that fails to recognize this is misdirected.

Shalom Mitchell
Israel Info Center
New York

Updated February 27, 2003