The Saudi Connection, two informed articles from
the US neo-conservative, Weekly Standard :
'http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/277gkmhl.asp
Saudi
Friends, Saudi Foes
+ The
Saudi Connection
Saudi
Friends, Saudi Foes
Is our Arab ally part of the problem?
by Stephen Schwartz
THE
EXTRAORDINARY ACT of destruction seen on September 11 had a noteworthy
harbinger in Islamic history. In 1925, Ibn Saud, founder of the present
Saudi Arabian dynasty, ordered the wholesale destruction of the sacred
tombs, graveyards, and mosques in Mecca and Medina. These are, of course,
the two holy cities of Islam, whose sanctity the Saudi exile Osama bin Laden
and other Islamist extremists ostensibly seek to protect from the defiling
presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil.
Saud’s armed supporters, in a frenzy of iconoclasm, first leveled Jannat
al-Baqi, the "heavenly orchard" in Medina, where one of the
original associates of Muhammad was buried under the prophet’s
supervision. Other relatives and thousands of early companions of the
prophet were also interred at the site, as were the imams Hassan and
Hussein, venerated by Sunni and Shia Muslims. All these graves were wrecked
by Saud’s minions, who then looted the treasure at the prophet’s shrine.
The Saud party went on to demolish the cemetery in Mecca where the
prophet’s mother, grandfather, and first wife, Khadijah, were buried; then
to smash many more honored sites, devastating the architectural achievements
of Arabia, including mosques and even Muhammad’s house. Only the tomb of
the prophet was spared, after an outcry from traditional Muslims.
This spree of vandalism was accompanied by wholesale massacres of Muslims
suspected of rejecting Wahhabism, a fanatical strain of Islam that emerged
in Arabia in the eighteenth century and has periodically disturbed the
Muslim world. In the nineteenth century, it fueled the Arab nationalist
challenge to the tolerant and easygoing Ottoman Empire; and it became, and
remains today, the state-sanctioned doctrine of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
founded in 1932.
These events of 75 years ago aid in understanding the violence of bin Laden
and other Islamic terrorists, who (since the waning of atheist leftism as a
motivating ideology) are all Wahhabis. A direct line extends from the
demolition of the holy places in Medina and Mecca through the slaughter of
58 tourists in Egypt in 1997, the orgy of killing in Algeria in this decade,
and the bombardment of the Buddhist statues at Bamyan by the Taliban only
months ago to the assault on the World Trade Center, symbol of Western
wealth and power. In all these cases, unrestrained destruction and bloodshed
were justified by Wahhabi doctrine.
Wahhabis, who regard the veneration of the prophet and of saints as a
polytheistic corruption of Islam, are offended by the honoring of tombs and
shrines, along with many other traditional Muslim practices. Observance of
the prophet’s birthday, for example, is illegal in Saudi Arabia, although
lately Prince Abdullah has introduced a novel concession: Observances in
private homes will no longer be subject to suppression by the religious
police.
Wahhabism’s bloodstained record explains why so many Muslims around the
world fear and hate Islamic fundamentalism—and why certain marginal types
are drawn to it. As an acquaintance of mine put it, in Muslim Morocco, the
footloose young sons of the lower middle class and proletariat can take one
of three paths. They may adopt Western ways, drink and acquire girlfriends,
and be envied. They may take up the life of an ordinary observant Muslim and
be respected. Or they may join the Wahhabis—funded by the Saudis and
organized by such as bin Laden—and be feared.
This is the most important point for Western leaders to understand right
now: The West has multitudes of potential Muslim allies in the anti-terror
war. They are the ordinary, sane inhabitants of every Muslim nation, who
detest the fundamentalist violence from which they have suffered and which
is symbolized, now and forever, by the mass murder in New York.
There is another historical lesson to be drawn. Wahhabism—whose
quintessence is war on America—seeks to impel Islam centuries back in
time, to the faith’s beginnings, yet it is neither ancient nor
traditional. Indeed, it achieved its culmination, the establishment of the
Saudi kingdom, only in the 1930s, in parallel with fascism and Stalinism.
Although it appears to be a rejection of modernity, Wahhabism can usefully
be thought of as a variant of the nihilistic revolutionary ideologies that
spilled oceans of blood in the twentieth century but finally
collapsed—truly, the discredited lies consigned to history’s graveyard
of which President Bush spoke.
Saudi-backed Wahhabism may indeed follow communism to disintegration sooner
than we think; it may now stand at the close of its influence in the world.
That is because the Saudi regime has placed itself in a position much like
that of the Soviets at their end. The Saudis have been forced to make
concessions to the West that clash with the puritanical demands of Wahhabism;
their actions do not match their words. In the same way, the Bolshevik
rulers of Russia established an order blatantly in conflict with the
egalitarian and progressive promises held out by Communist ideology. And
like the Soviets, the Saudis have chosen a method of compensating for their
failures that will inevitably undermine their power.
The Soviet Union, although pledging coexistence with the capitalist nations,
wasted vast resources on Third World adventures intended to expand its
influence and legitimize its revolutionary rhetoric. These ranged from the
Spanish Civil War through the Korean War and on to Cuba, Indochina, Central
America, Africa, and of course Afghanistan. The irresolvable contradiction
between the reality of Soviet communism and its pretensions helped mightily
to prepare its downfall.
Similarly, the Saudi regime poses as an ally of the democracies in the
antiterrorist coalition, while continuing to spend vast sums of its oil
revenues to promote Wahhabi radicalism throughout the Islamic world and the
Muslim communities in the West, including America. Recall the Saudis’
obstruction of the investigation of the suicide-bombing of the Khobar towers
in which 19 Americans died in 1996. Now it emerges that almost all of the
footsoldiers of the September 11 conspiracy whose nationality has been
ascertained were Saudi nationals. The truth is that powerful elements in
Saudi society have supported Osama bin Laden throughout his campaign of
terror, just as they support the Taliban.
An incident observed after the war in Kosovo—in which the West liberated a
million and a half Muslims from a genocidal Serbia—shows how the Saudis
spread their vicious doctrine and in the process earn the contempt of
traditional Muslims. After the NATO bombing ended in July 1999, something
called the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo, or SJRCK, appeared on
the scene. In its first two months, the committee claimed to have spent a
million dollars.
Half of this was used to bring 388 Islamic "propagators" or
missionaries to Kosovo to spread Wahhabism among the Kosovars. A key goal
was to recruit young men for training as Wahhabi imams. Saudi-subsidized
mass "cultural programs" featuring prayers and lectures were held
in stadiums. Propaganda printed in Albanian pushed a simple message: Reject
the West in its totality. The Albanians were unreceptive, and soon the
Saudis and "aid workers" from other Gulf states had become so
overbearing that the local Muslim clergy were urging U.N. administrators to
expel them from Kosovo. The mufti of Kosovo, Dr. Rexhep Boja, declared that
the Kosovars had been Muslims for more than 500 years and needed no
instruction in the faith from foreigners.
Such anecdotes, common in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, India,
and elsewhere, should help the West address its immediate problem: How to
beat terrorism without being seen to lead the global crusade against Islam
that Wahhabi propaganda insists we intend? We must first abandon the
illusion that because the Saudis are rich and their economic interests
coincide with ours they are all our friends. But we must also commit time
and effort to helping forward-looking, mainstream, and above all anti-Wahhabi
Muslims become part of a permanent coalition for worldwide security.
Many strategists in Western capitals ask where we will find Muslims prepared
to stand by the West. One tested Muslim statesman who is widely respected,
even idolized, in the Islamic world is the wartime president of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic. A learned and pious Muslim who was
imprisoned for his faith by Tito’s Communist regime, Izetbegovic led the
fight for the survival of Bosnian Islam. He is an authentic warrior in a
legitimate jihad.
In 1997, addressing the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Tehran,
Izetbegovic declared, "Islam is best, but we [Muslims] are not the
best. The West is neither corrupted nor degenerate. It is strong, well
educated, and organized. Their schools are better than ours. Their cities
are cleaner than ours. The level of respect for human rights in the West is
higher, and the care for the poor and less capable is better organized.
Westerners are usually responsible and accurate in their words. Instead of
hating the West, let us proclaim cooperation instead of confrontation."
Izetbegovic, of course, is not an Arab, but neither are most of the Muslims
in the world. Most of the world’s Muslims, given the chance, would gladly
side with Izetbegovic against both bin Laden and his patrons in Saudi
Arabia, a culturally incoherent, politically two-faced country that we
should regard as a state backer of terrorism at least as dangerous as Libya
or Iran.
Stephen Schwartz is working on a book to be entitled The Two Faces of Islam.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/000/393rwyib.asp
The
Saudi Connection
Osama bin Laden's a lot closer to the Saudi royal family than you think.
by David Wurmser
TWO
QUESTIONS have been raised about Osama bin Laden. First, if bin Laden
opposes the Saudi regime, why has he never struck Saudi targets? Second, if
he threatens Saudi Arabia, why has the Saudi government taken the lead in
recognizing and funding the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which is
entwined with bin Laden's al Qaeda organization? The answer is: The bin
Laden problem is deeply embedded both in Saudi religious and dynastic
politics and in an effort by Iraq and Syria to shift the balance of power in
the Middle East.
To begin to unravel this murky business, it is necessary to go back to the
mid 1990s, when a succession struggle was beginning in Saudi Arabia. This
struggle pits the octogenarian king, Fahd bin Abdel-Aziz, and his full
brothers in the Sudairi branch of the family (especially the defense
minister, Prince Sultan) against their half-brother, Crown Prince Abdallah.
King Fahd and the Sudairis favor close ties to the United States, while
Crown Prince Abdallah prefers Syria and is generally more enamored of
pan-Islamic and pan-Arab ideas. All of these contenders are old. Whoever
succeeds in securing the crown after Fahd will anoint the next generation of
royal heirs and determine Saudi Arabia's future course--either toward the
West or toward Syria, Iraq, and others who challenge the position of the
United States in the region.
Abdallah is closely allied with the puritanical Wahhabi religious
establishment that has underpinned the Saudi government for over a century.
The Wahhabis are strident and hostile to a continued American presence in
the Middle East. They made this explicit in 1990 in a pronouncement known as
the Muzkara an-Nasiha, originated by Osama bin Laden and signed by virtually
every sheikh in the Wahhabi establishment. It condemned Saudi Arabia's
decision to allow U.S. troops into the kingdom for the purpose of resisting
Saddam.
Crown Prince Abdallah has long challenged the Sudairi branch by pushing an
anti-Western agenda. In mid 1995, numerous Arab newspapers reported that the
crown prince was working with Syria and Egypt to sabotage Jordanian-Saudi
rapprochement. The same year, the Turkish weekly Nokta reported that
Abdallah had blocked Turkish-Saudi ties by ordering the execution of some
Turks, incarcerated for drug-dealing, after King Fahd had assured Turkish
emissaries that they would be spared.
In late 1995, King Fahd became ill and feeble, passing power temporarily to
Abdallah. When shortly afterwards Abdallah briefly visited a neighboring
state, his Sudairi rival, Prince Sultan, asserted power in Riyadh. Abdallah
returned to reclaim his dominance, but to do so he employed his wife's close
family ties to the Assad clan and invited Syrian intelligence operatives
into the kingdom. Then the problems began.
ABDALLAH'S QUEST to secure the succession--leading as it did to his
strategic relationship with Syrian president Hafez Assad, and their joint
willingness to cooperate with Iraq--is essential background to the major
terrorist attacks of recent years, including Khobar Towers, the USS Cole,
and September 11. When Abdallah invited Syrian intelligence into Saudi
Arabia, he created an opportunity for Syria to foster a terror network on
Saudi soil. Its handiwork surfaced first in a minor attack on an American
bus in Jeddah in 1995, then in the major attack on Khobar in June 1996 in
which 19 U.S. servicemen died. The Washington Post reported that the Khobar
bomb had originated in Syrian-controlled Lebanon, and just this month,
members of the Syrian-backed Hezbollah were indicted in a U.S. court for
this attack.
Sober strategic considerations brought Abdallah, Syria, and Iraq together.
The years 1995 and 1996 were watershed years in the Middle East. Before
then, hopeful developments (from the American point of view) had seemed
afoot in the region. Between 1992 and 1995, Israel had formed a strategic
relationship with Turkey; Jordan and Israel had signed a peace treaty with
strategic cooperation clauses; Saddam had faced a viable, advancing
opposition movement; and Jordan had become the vanguard of an anti-Saddam
grouping after the defection in Amman of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal.
Pro-Western elements of the Saudi royal family pushed to reestablish
Jordanian-Saudi ties, solidify Saudi-Turkish ties, and anchor Saudi Arabia
in this emerging, powerful, pro-Western regional bloc.
This was a time when the Palestine Liberation Organization averted near
collapse only by the generosity of Israel. And the Iranian revolution was
floundering. The memory of America's twin victories in the Gulf War and the
Cold War was fresh, and Israel's image of invulnerability earned in half a
dozen wars still loomed large. Syria, Iraq, and the PLO faced the prospect
of a loose-knit pro-American coalition of Turkey, a post-Saddam Iraq,
Jordan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. But tyrants like Saddam and Assad, and
tyrannical regimes like Iran's and the PLO's, never accept defeat, which can
mean only disgrace or death.
Survival demanded action. It took many forms but crystallized when Syria and
Iraq turned from enemies to bedfellows against America; when the Palestinian
Authority became sufficiently established to host a smorgasbord of terror
groups; and when Abdallah invited Syria into the kingdom. The bin Laden
network developed inside this Wahhabi/Abdallah-Syria-Iraq-PLO strategic bloc
and became its terrorist skeleton, unifying hitherto separate, isolated, and
strategically uncoordinated groups.
While al Qaeda from the start was rooted in the Wahhabi religious
establishment, it sprouted and flourished parasitically wherever Iraqi
intelligence felt secure: Sudan, then Yemen and Qatar. Bin Laden himself
left Saudi Arabia in 1991 for Sudan, where he lived until his removal, via
Yemen and Qatar, to Afghanistan in 1996.
For Syria, the new terrorist super-network had the virtue of absorbing and
channeling Sunni fundamentalist fervor. Energies that might have been turned
against the regime were directed instead against American targets and into
Saudi politics. Within the terror network, Shiite and Sunni--who otherwise
would never have countenanced working together--could join forces, as could
secular Palestinians and Islamic extremists, all the while deflecting their
attention from Damascus.
For Iraq, the network offered a way to defeat America. It would be a grave
mistake to imagine that Saddam's animus against Saudi Arabia or his secular
disposition would prevent him from working with the Wahhabi religious
establishment or Abdallah if he found this could advance his designs against
King Fahd, the Sudairis, or their American patrons. Sure enough, travelers
from Iraq report that Saddam's regime has lately encouraged the rise, in
Iraq's northern safe haven, of Salafism, a puritanical sect tied to
Wahhabism that hitherto had been alien to Iraq. It is no surprise, then,
that one of these Salafi movements inside Iraq, the Jund al-Islami, turns
out to be a front for bin Laden.
AT ITS CORE, al Qaeda is a product of Saudi dynastic politics. Its purpose
is to swing Saudi politics toward the Wahhabi establishment and Crown Prince
Abdallah, but not necessarily to destroy the royal family, at least not at
first. The most virulent of Saudi dissident groups, such as al-Masari's
Committee for the Defense of Legal Rights, call for violence, but they
pointedly direct their wrath against the Sudairis, the only targets they
mention by name. Bin Laden seeks to destroy the Sudairis indirectly, by
separating them from America.
In August 2001, King Fahd fired his director of intelligence, Prince Turki
al Faisal. It was a blow to bin Laden. The bin Laden and Faisal families
have longstanding ties: Osama's father helped install King Faisal, who
reigned from 1964 to 1975. Since the mid 1990s, Turki had anchored the
Abdallah faction, and under his leadership Saudi intelligence had become
difficult to distinguish from al Qaeda. In particular, Saudi intelligence
had served as bin Laden's nexus to the Wahhabi network of charities,
foundations, and other funding sources.
Here too family ties are important. Thus, Turki's brother heads a key Saudi
"philanthropic" organization (originally headed by Osama) that
funds the Taliban and al Qaeda, according to the Lebanese weekly East-West
Review. And the Central Asia operations officer in Saudi intelligence is the
brother of bin Laden's chief case officer on Saudi Arabia, according to a
former CIA official in Iraq. The same former official also reports that
Turki was instrumental in arranging a meeting in Kandahar, Afghanistan,
between the head of Iraq's terror network, Faruk Hejazi, and bin Laden in
December 1998. More recently, Turki bin Faisal's full brother, Saudi foreign
minister Saud bin Faisal, unleashed his diplomats to write shrill and
caustic attacks on the United States, such as the article a few weeks ago by
Saudi Arabia's ambassador in London, Ghazi al Qusaibi, calling President
Bush mentally unstable.
But like Frankenstein's monster, bin Laden is becoming a problem for his
creators. It is unclear whether Saudi royal factions now control al Qaeda,
or bin Laden has become a kingmaker--or aspiring king. Many young princes
who face bleak prospects in a gilded, top-heavy royal structure are enamored
of bin Laden. This is true even of some Sudairis. Indeed, bin Laden's
lieutenants, far from hailing from the margins of society, are products of
its elite, with whom they maintain relations. The mastermind of Arab
terrorism in the 1980s and '90s, Imad Mughniyeh, a godfather-like figure
with links to the PLO, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda, comes from an illustrious
family. His father was a cleric renowned among Shiites. And bin Laden's
second in command, the Egyptian al-Zawahiri, is the grandson of the head of
al-Azhar mosque in Egypt. Syria too, meanwhile, may be feeling the pressure
of bin Laden's growing power. Damascus recently had to put down a Wahhabi-inspired
revolt in Lebanon's Akkar mountains led by bin Laden associate Bassam Kanj.
It is impossible to avoid concluding, then, that the bin Laden phenomenon is
about politics and conflicts within and among states. Some states in the
region--such as Jordan and Kuwait--can truthfully deny employing and
abetting terror. But many Arab states refuse to consent to America's
expanding the war beyond Afghanistan because they know the trail of terror
will eventually lead to them. They have trafficked in terror, believing they
could harness it and use it to their advantage--none more than Saudi Arabia.
This is why the Saudis blocked the American investigation into the Khobar
attack, never investigated the December 2000 hijacking of a plane from
Jeddah to Baghdad by two men from Abdallah's security forces, and now,
according to press reports, lag in providing access to possible culprits and
relevant documents.
Bin Laden emerged from a dangerous strategic shift underway since 1995 that
was driven by dynastic rivalries. Now, al Qaeda must be dealt with not only
in Afghanistan, but also at its source--in the strategic triangle of Syria,
Iraq, and the Wahhabi/Abdallah alliance whose interests it serves and whose
structures and politics brought it to life. To fail to strike at the roots
of al Qaeda will only lengthen the war and make it more deadly.
David Wurmser is director of Middle East studies at the American Enterprise
Institute.
October 29, 2001 - Volume 7, Number 7